. To the surprise of many, including the Chinese, the AIIB has quickly gained great momentum. By the end of March 2015, which the Chinese government set as the deadline for countries to apply to be founding members of the bank, 57 countries from Asia and beyond had submitted their applications. Some countries that did not meet the deadline have nonetheless expressed an interest in participation in the future.
After ratifications were received on 25 th Dec, 2015 from 10 member States who hold a total numbers of initial subscriptions of the authorized capital stock, the agreement entered into force and the Bank started operation and open for business on 16 th January,
On this day, the board of governors of the Bank convened its inaugural meeting in
Beijing and declared the bank open for business and Jin Lqun was elected as the bank's president for a five-year term (Wikipedia, 2016) .
It is instructive to note that China's success in establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the latest sign of a broader move away from the view that aid to developing countries is best provided in the form of massive government-togovernment transfers. This shows that power and wealth are not only diffusing across the international system, but also within states, such that corporations, foundations, wealthy individuals, private investment funds, civil society groups, and most recently, municipal governments all have a role to play in development (Slaughter, 2015) .
The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) reflects the greater economic importance of Emerging Economies particularly China. The AIIB, together with other China-led initiatives, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent
Reserve Arrangement (CRA), has a combined capital base of $250 billion. This represents significant financial firepower roughly on par with the World Bank. The creation of these new institutions partly reflects China's growing dissatisfaction with the existing global multilateral financial frameworks where the country (rightly) feels under represented, since it is now the second largest national economy worldwide, similar in size to the entire euro area. China, along with other emerging market economies, complains about its limited clout in bodies like the IMF, and over the slow pace of reform in addressing this imbalance (EU, 2015) . percent and 15.6 percent respectively. It is therefore obvious that the dominance by both countries and slow pace in reforms underlie China's wish to establish the AIIB (Isabel & Enda, 2015) .
It is instructive to note that while the AIIB has "Asia" in its name, the ambitions are worldwide, and founding members now include nations from Europe and Africa. About 57 countries had joined the AIIB, with the notable exceptions of the U.S, Japan and Canada. Initially, the interest was not so overwhelming. According to Lu, Wu & Meng (2015) , Leo Melamed, Father of Financial Futures, observed that China's leading the initiative is worth cheering. Economy of Asia accounts for 33% of the world (Wang, 2015) . After Britain's application for entering AIIB, the Professor of University of Western Australia, Mark Beeson quoted in Lu, Wu & Meng (2015) makes the following comments "Britain's decision is really a key of the current new international order." Based on the above point of view, domestic scholars have discussed issues on system design, risk management, product risk, while foreign scholars mainly make comments on attitude from different countries.
As noted earlier, many scholars believe that the development of the AIIB follows longstanding criticism by China of existing organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which it sees as offering only limited roles for emerging economies. Unfortunately, according to Mahbubani (2015) Mahbubani, 2015) .
It is also imperative to note that China's previous development cooperative activities serve as a good precedence for its AIIB. China's South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) was a good example. China's approach in SSDC differs from the international aid literature of established donors, focusing on "poor helps the poor" and "solider teaches solders" by utilizing China's comparative advantage and by combining trade, investment and development cooperation. In official language, China follows the principles of equality and mutual respect, reciprocity, mutual benefit, and non-interference of domestic affairs. Aside from adherence to the "One China" principle, no political strings are attached to China's cooperation (State Council Information Office, 2011) . This is not to say that China's aid or development cooperative activities are "altruistic", they are not.
Seriously they are mutual benefit. The government "never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual." This "mutual (economic) benefit" is based on the simple idea of "exchanging what I have with what you have" (hutong youwu) from which both can gain, as we learned from Adam Smith. This is actually a market-based approach which ensures the incentives of both partners are aligned (Wang & Lin, 2015) .
AIIB Policy Design: Complements Vs Substitutes
China has created an action plan for its Silk Road concept in the form of the "One Belt,
One Road" (OBOR) initiative. It is grandiose, potentially involving an area that covers 55 percent of world GNP, 70 percent of global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves. China's financial commitments to the project seem huge: some multilateral and bilateral pledges may overlap, but it is still likely we are looking at up to $300 billion in infrastructure financing from China in the coming years (Yini, 2015) -not counting the leveraging effect on private investors and lenders, and the impact of peer competition.
China and its partners in the AIIB thus plan to build big things -roads, bridges, dams, railroads and ports -that unquestionably power an economy and that citizens notice, but that the US, and for that matter the World Bank, no longer funds. The world's great expectations further increase the audience for what the Chinese sometimes describe as the country's "second opening," after the 1979 model which led to China's rapid growth over three decades. For example, there is much discussion of the success beyond all expectations of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Intense debate is being carried out about the Silk Roads in countries that have reason to worry about some of their implications (Godement, 2015) .
Now it is being implemented with both political capital and hard currency. In terms of the latter, as Jacobson (2015) China's push for the AIIB originated from China's frustration towards the existing international financial institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank that favour the West through voting rights distribution and head post appointments, as well as the ADB, which holds Japan as the largest shareholder and has traditionally maintained Japanese presidents. It could be a part of China's national strategic plan to raise its stature in the international financial system to match its status as the number two country in the world by GDP. Regarding the necessity of the AIIB, China has reasoned that the ADB and the World Bank alone cannot provide for the growing infrastructure needs in Asia; it has also pointed to the IMF's new quota reform, which has not been ratified due to opposition from Congress in the United States. This second point, especially, plays on the United
States weakness (Ito, 2015) .
When the AIIB was first proposed in October 2013 China was prepared to do the following: establish its headquarters in Beijing; appoint a Chinese president; secure capital up to 100 billion dollars; and establish China as 50% holder of AIIB shares. The initial consensus, mostly expressed by the developed countries, was that the AIIB would be "a Bank of China, by China and for China," and would not be accepted as an
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Nearly half a month before the deadline at the end of March to become charter members of the AIIB, the United Kingdom suddenly announced it would join the AIIB and entered into negotiations. Germany, France, Italy, Australia, and Korea quickly followed suit, announcing their participation in the new infrastructural investment bank.
The charter members thus took shape with Japan, the United States, and Canada as the only major players to be excluded.
The unfolding of the membership application process really attracted attention far beyond the development and financial circles all over the world. In early March 2015, the United Kingdom surprised the world by announcing its decision to join the AIIB, despite the explicit warning of the United States to the contrary. In response, the US government openly criticized the British government for doing so without consultation with the United States, and for its "constant accommodation of China" (Dyer & Parker, 2015) .
What followed was an avalanche of new applications from major economies in different parts of the world, including most of the United States' strong allies, such as Germany, France, Italy, Korea, Australia, Taiwan and Israel. Left in a state of diplomatic isolation, the United States then has to soften its opposition to the new bank, but the embarrassment has been profound.
The embarrassment was so enormous that former US Treasury Secretary Larry
Summers (2015) commented: "This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system." Also, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it just as bluntly: "We screwed it up" (quoted in Sands, 2015) . Pundits and reporters across the globe have portrayed the establishment of the AIIB as a symbol of the emergence of a new international financial/economic order (Chhibber, 2015; Zhongkai, 2015) and of a power shift from a declining United States to a rising China (Merry, 2015; Shen, 2015) .
The bank aims at "complementing the existing efforts of the multi-lateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development". Publications in
Chinese have stressed that the NDB, CRA and AIIB will act as complements to, rather Moreover, the NDB and AIIB will only meet a small portion of the global demand for infrastructure. According to the World Bank, the infrastructure deficit in low-and middleincome countries adds up to US$ 1 trillion, and the gap is widening as emerging economies continue to grow. There should be plenty of room for at least a few more banking acronyms.
Based on the above point of view, we can deduce that regional scholars have largely focused on system design, risk management, how multilateral development banks are dominated by the United States and how global financial governance has always favoured developed economies, while international scholars mainly make comments on attitude from different countries. Therefore, this study is a comprehensive assessment of opportunities and challenges of AIIB especially for Africa which is still in lack.
Historical Overview of Global Financial Institutions
When United States, so they are also pursuing national, bilateral and regional strategies. As we will see below, instead of relying on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to which they had contributing more, they are now also amassing their own foreign exchange reserves (self-insurance), using bilateral credit lines in moments of vulnerability and reinforcing regional arrangements (Held & Young, 2009 ).
Thus, to understand the functioning of the system of global financial governance, it is very important to also understand the national background of the institutions functioning in that system. This will enable us to estimate the role a particular institution plays in the system and indeed those institutions do not only shape the system itself and elaborate the implied regulation within the system, but more precise look at them can also help to understand the power relations within the system. In the recent time especially after the world financial crisis, the international and transnational attempts to create an effective system of financial regulation increased dramatically. The system of financial governance and global financial governance in particular consists of multinational, interacting with each other, layers of institutional rules and processes, in which the decision made in one institution affects the decisionmaking process in other institutions. In globalized world, influence is often mediated through institutions, which open up the possibilities for a "skewed participation" (Shaffer, 2005:131) , which allows more powerful actors indirectly influence the decision made there, but their power can also be restricted by institution rules and procedures.
Regional institutions in
Wang (2015) to have been a decisive moment, when nations came together to redesign the international financial system, but it was actually the culmination of an extended historical process that had been underway for a number of years.
The final blueprint of the new international financial system drew heavily from the intellectual and policy experiments that had been going on since the 1930s, including the New Deal in the United States, state led economic growth in Latin American countries and various international currency-stabilization programs (Helleiner, 2014) .
Similarly, the emergence of a new international financial architecture today is not likely to be accomplished by a single event. The establishment of the AIIB as a China-led international development bank may seem to be a momentous turning point from a USdominated financial governance system. But it is only the latest event in more than a decade of increasing Chinese involvement in minilateral financial cooperation (Wang, 2014) .
Compared with the earlier regional financial arrangements, the more recent initiative of financial minilateralism -the AIIB, is far more China-centred. However, several common ideas underlie this minilateral institution -dissatisfaction with, and distrust in, the Bretton Woods institutions dominated by Western powers, a strong desire for selfassurance and mutual assistance, and a belief in the importance of infrastructure for 136 Africa's Public Service Delivery & Performance Review economic development and the role of governments therein. These ideas have come from years of development experience of China and other countries in the region, and from their disappointment in how Bretton Woods's institutions responded to the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis (Wang, 2015) .
The United States, which initially cautioned nations against joining the AIIB, has expressed concern over how much influence China will wield in the new institution.
China has maintained it will not have veto powers, unlike the World Bank where
Washington has a limited veto. Xinhua news agency quoted China's vice finance minister Shi Yaobin as saying that China did not seek a veto in the bank, describing its stake and voting share in the initial stage as a "natural result" of current rules. The ministry added that the initial stakes and voting rights of China and other founding members would be gradually diluted as other members joined. If the establishment of the AIIB were to be followed by major reforms of the Bretton Woods system, the sources of reforms would have to be traced to the incremental process of change of the previous decade or more (Qing & Blanchard, 2015) .
Stakeholders' arguments for reforming the international financial system can be traced back a long way. In the early 1980s, faced with a destabilized exchange rate system, French and US finance officials called for a new Bretton Woods conference, although it was never acted on (Boughton, 2009) . Although the old system showed more and more problems, a new system did not come into being because reform lost impetus.
Scholarly discussions of a new Bretton Woods system go back to at least the same time (Camps, 1980; Helleiner, 1983; Wang, 2015) . standards remains largely intact. The Financial Stability Board, established after the crisis to strengthen financial regulation, has limited capacity (Helleiner, 2014) .
In recent years, the Chinese government continues to make great efforts to get more right in World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organisation, but the ultimate effect is limited.
The establishment of AIIB is a signal of major emerging economies starting outside "Bretton Woods". From the angle of the responsibility of the international community, China provides international public goods and promotes the development of the country's economic development, which reflects international responsibility of a big country. Many developing countries have made great achievements after decades of economic construction. Taking China's foreign exchange reserves as an example, it is up to $4.3 trillion through years of accumulation. China has the financial capacity to export capital and rescuing other developing countries. It is in ample supply and demand of funds and a new international financial that the idea of AIIB emerged (Lu, Wu & Meng, 2015) .
One Belt One Road: Opportunities and Challenges for African States

Opportunities for African States
Poor infrastructural development has always been the bane of regional integration among African countries. Lack of progress in implementing agreements along with the dearth of reliable transport, energy and information and technology infrastructure make the journey towards regional integration long and arduous. Even with the current gains Africa is making in upgrading regional infrastructure, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Union's development arm, finds the continent still faces serious infrastructure shortcomings across all sectors, both in terms of access and quality. NEPAD has just completed a 30-year plan that focuses on regional trans-border projects like the 4,500-km highway from Algiers in Algeria to Lagos, Nigeria. Africa requires huge investments to develop, upgrade and maintain its infrastructure. The African Development Bank, (AfDB) estimates the region would need to spend an additional $40 billion a year on infrastructure to address not only current weaknesses but also to keep pace with economic growth (Tafirenyika, 2014 ).
China's establishment of the AIIB is the latest sign of a broader move away from the view that aid to developing countries is best provided in the form of massive government-to-government transfers. Power and wealth are not only diffusing across the international system, but also within states, such that corporations, foundations, wealthy individuals, private investment funds, civil society groups, and most recently, municipal governments all have a role to play in development (Slaughter, 2015) .
The bilateral Silk Road Fund is intended to finance investment in transportation infrastructure throughout a "Silk Road Economic Belt" stretching across Central Asia to Europe, and a "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" across the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Middle East. It will also finance China's access to Central
Asia's energy sources (Wihtol, 2015) .
One good opportunity that Africa stands to benefit from AIIB is "rebalancing" the world economy. The "economic imbalances" that characterizes most African States are the root causes of financial crisis and that China is expected to provide more public goods" to mitigate them. This argument, playing on the terms "imbalances" and "rebalancing", could be interpreted as an indirect criticism of the US. It is also imperative for African State to be concerned about China's rise because, historically, a country that grows more powerful tends to "bully" others. However, the world has entered a new period: China today is "a giver, not a taker" and it aims to help poorer countries in its neighbourhood to develop (Bondaz, 2015) .
Apart from Namibia which appears to be relatively developed in terms of will now get more of the roughly $8 trillion that the Asian Development Bank has estimated that the region will need to keep growing through 2020 (Slaughter, 2015) .
Certainly China's motive has been commerce rather than stressing a need for Africa's political and economic reform (Mohan & Power, 2008) in contradiction to the West that sought to introduce a neoliberal ideal (Carrier & Miller, 1998 ). It appears not to have been a "civilizing" nor a proselytizing motive. Yet there has been an emerging line within the international relations literature that alludes to a nationalist perspective and a
Chinese perception of superiority of Chinese culture: that it is the patriotic duty of China's elites to spread Chinese values and culture around the world (Nyiri, 2006; Callahan, 2008 It is understandable that China would have a dominant role, but the fact that it did not officially demand veto power gave incentive for more states to sign up. This shows that "the AIIB's structure can still be negotiated," (Mingjiang in Teo, 2015) . In fact, a Wall Street Journal article in March 2015 said China agreed to forgo its veto power to win the support of key European nations (Wei & Davis, 2015) . Beijing, however, has maintained that it does not seek it. China's emphasis on the bank's inclusive nature and its willingness to work with similar institutions like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) helped allay concerns, according to experts. Moreover, its focus on infrastructure-building in a region sorely lacking it and the opportunity this gives to Western firms to be involved in new projects whittled away at US arguments against the bank (Teo, 2015) .
As of March 2015 ending -the deadline to apply to become an AIIB founding member -46 countries across five continents had signed up. The founding members, including Singapore, will help create the bank's governance and operational rules. States that join after the deadline will have voting rights, but less say in making the rules. As
China has no previous experience managing a multilateral lender, the future of AIIB, which has an initial capital of US$50 billion (S$68 billion), remains uncertain. Concerns remain over how democratic and transparent its governance structure will be and if it will uphold high lending standards. This includes issues such as how the bank's voting shares will be split and how its board of directors will be structured. Dingding quoted in Teo (2015) said Beijing must make a serious effort to show that the AIIB is not just another weapon for China to dominate South-east Asia. Failing to do so would jeopardize not only the AIIB's goals but also China's aim of a peaceful rise.
Also, Gallagher quoted in Teo (2015) observed that relinquishing veto power is better for Beijing in the long run. Other issues such as where the bank's headquarters will be and the people it hires are also being closely watched amid fears that Beijing will use the AIIB as a geopolitical tool. It must be noted that Chinese officials are of the opinion that the bank's headquarters should be in Beijing. Also, Jakarta has equally lobbied for the same position as Indonesia seeks a major AIIB role (Wihtol, 2015) .
Challenges for African States
There are some major problems with China's plan for the AIIB governance structure. The first problem is that China will be by far the leading shareholder in the bank. It has already been determined that the ratio of quota (voting shares) held by regional members to non-regional members will be constant at 3 to 1, thus limiting the influence of African nations from the outset. It is instructive to note that because the participation of Western countries in AIIB is limited, China has remained its undisputed leader. In the same vein, very few African nations have joined the bank. To date, only Egypt and South Africa are members of AIIB.
Apart from the way the bank is managed, the quality of the projects the AIIB invests in will also be a litmus test. There are concerns that the bank might fail to keep global together closely in the World Bank, the ADB and other multilateral banks" (Teo, 2015) .
One major challenge which African countries may face as members and beneficiaries of AIIB is the need to be conscious of the level of their involvement in the organization.
It must be emphasized that the incumbent international financial intermediaries like
World Bank and IMF have been plagued by ineffective recommendations which fail to resolve the economic problems within the borrower African countries. It is on record that the IMF attached conditionality to loans which has led to the loss of a borrower country's authority to self-govern its domestic economy due to the fact that national economic policies of such nations are tied to the IMF loan package conditions. Not only that the World Bank's lending policies has also been criticized because of its social and economic implications on the affected African countries. A good example of this is the hydro-electric dam projects funded in many African countries which has led to displacement of many indigenous populations. Notwithstanding the aforementioned challenges, AIIB can be the balancing beam to reset the status quo in Africa and other developing countries and to possibly become a driving force for the rest of the globe as alternative to World Bank and IMF (Ku, 2015) .
Conclusion and Recommendations
Conclusion
With the expansion of infrastructure, establishment of AIIB welcomes the opportunity.
The current world economic situation has undergone new changes, and Asia has contributed more than 50 percent into the world economic growth. Besides, developing and emerging market countries have accounted for more than 50 percent in the proportion of total global economy. In order to meet the growing financing needs, urgent need for multilateral financial agencies like AIIB is necessary.
The establishment and development of AIIB need support from all over the world.
AIIB is designed to provide financing methods for infrastructure in developing countries, during which China needs to play an active role in advocacy and coordination and seeks The same thing applies to the relations between major countries. When China and the U.S., the two largest economies in the world, cooperate, it makes a difference.
Furthermore, it is the recommendation of this paper that it is very important for the Chinese led-bank-AIIB, to keep politics and economy balance. Since its first attempt to establish an international development agency for China, China may find it difficult to keep balance of politics and economy. As AIIB's headquartered is preferred in Beijing the bank may set up a branch in the South Asian region such as Indian capital city, New
Delhi. The branch in Southeast Asian region can also be located in Jakarta. Branches in Central Asia may be located in Russia Moscow, which can substantially constitute to
Beijing as the vertex, Moscow, New Delhi and Jakarta as the first line of an isosceles triangle, and expand the scope of radiation Asian investment bank (Sheng & Cao, 2015) .
